A female acquaintance of mine was recently surprised to find that both of her sons were colourblind, despite neither parent being colourblind. A natural question to ask is ‘What are the odds?’ This question turns out to be open to interpretation, depending on what we mean by probability and odds.
I recently started volunteering for Julian Huppert’s campaign to become the Liberal Democrat MP for Cambridge. (For more on that, go to their website.) Some of the other volunteers were members of the tech sector; as such, they used a lot of encryption in their work, had a lucid understanding of how encryption works. Of course, we are all very strongly worried by the attitudes towards Internet surveillance and encryption that Theresa May and the Conservative Party seem to hold. These includes last year’s Snoopers’ Charter, which gives the option of requiring ISPs to hand over users’ browsing history to the state (and not just to police and security agencies, but also other, unrelated, branches of government). More recently, the section on digital issues in the Conservative Party manifesto* contains rather troublesome proposals, including
- Verify, a single digital ID system to be used for both government services and private services such as banking, and
- the words ‘we do not believe that there should be a safe space for terrorists to be able to communicate online and will work to prevent them from having this capability’.
Unsurprisingly, the Manchester bombing last week will be used to justify activating the Snoopers’ Charter (but only after the election, of course!).
* I actually rather like some other parts of that section in the manifesto, especially ‘central and local government will be required to release information regularly and in an open format’; such a process would be long and costly, but would be very useful for future policymakers.
Like me, Julian and many others, they were quick to point out how heavily encryption is used in day-to-day, perfectly innocuous transactions over the Internet. (See also this piece by the web company Mythic Beasts.) We also knew how surveillance or web censorship could be defeated, using freely available tools such as Tor. Despite all these things, the Tory attitude towards Internet surveillance stands popular; Labour and the SNP abstained in the vote over the Snoopers’ Charter.
Why are we doing so poorly in this argument? One reason is that
Or, more facetiously:
Okay, my use of the phrase ‘widespread public understanding of encryption’ may be a little hyperbolic, since I can’t speak for the country as a whole. But I think it’s clear that plenty of people don’t understand that normal people use encryption, not just criminals, perverts and terrorists. In some ways, this is laudable: it illustrates how computer and software manufacturers have been able to preconfigure their systems so that people can use them safely without having to think about all the processes (like encryption) that go on under the bonnet. The fact that computing is so accessible is a good thing. One should not need an understanding of mechanical engineering and combustion chemistry in order to drive a car.
However, the same sort of accessibility means that there is a large disjunction between how most people use their computers, and how techies use them. (I know ‘techies’ is a very loose term.) It’s true that policies such as censorship, surveillance and ‘bans’ on encryption can be defeated easily by those with the technical know-how. This doesn’t mean that the policy is moot, because
Many people will go along with these authoritarian digital policies, reasoning along the lines of ‘I have nothing to hide, so I have nothing to fear’, or ‘we should do anything to keep our children and our country safe’. How else is it that the Great Firewall of China manages to keep a billion people in check, despite its many weaknesses?
The upcoming election may be a fait accompli as far as this issue is concerned. Labour is not devoted to protecting digital liberties, while the Conservatives are keen to abolish them. (Perhaps a third party, either in a coalition or in opposition, may be strong enough to moderate the government on this issue, but neither the LibDems nor the Greens are likely to be strong enough to do that effectively.) As we continue campaigning on this issue until and after the election, we must not focus too much on the technical weaknesses. In doing so, we’d risk blinding people with endless facts about Tor, VPNs, RSA and other obscure three-letter words and acronyms. Instead, we must focus on the social harms of a surveillance state and the benefits of personal privacy (including as a matter of LGBT+ rights).
Tim Farron, current leader of the Liberal Democrats, once said that he thought that homosexuality was a sin. This led to a lot of anger in some circles, and the fear that the Liberal Democrats would not fight sufficiently strongly for (or could even oppose) LGBT+ rights.
Farron has more recently clarified his position by saying that his ‘views on personal morality [didn’t] matter’ and that this was not party policy. The right-wing blogger Guido Fawkes has spun this as: ‘Tim Farron has his beliefs and he seems willing to compromise them for political gain.’
Nobody seems to think that the vegetarian Jeremy Corbyn would ban meat-eating if he got into power, or that it he’d be compromising his moral stance by not banning meat-eating. Why should LGBT+ issues be any different?
Accurate estimates of the sizes of transgender populations are hard to come by, but according to an article in The Times on Thursday, there are about 650,000 people in the UK (around 1%) who identify as transgender. The article does not cite a source and, unfortunately, the online version is behind a paywall (to which I have no access).
In an article from nine months ago, The Guardian cites a ‘conservative’ estimate of 0.2%, or around 130,000.
I was quite surprised to learn that this number was so high. For comparison, the 2011 census found that around 430,000 people identified as having Chinese ethnicity, and that around 270,000 identified their religion as Judaism. These groups, as well as many other minorities, are not represented well in Parliament or other high-ranking positions.
I’ve just submitted a petition (indeed, my first) to the UK government.
The petition is still in the sponsorship stage, but you can click this link to sign it. Once it becomes live I shall put the updated link here. The petition became live on 7 April, and can be found here. The text is below:
The government must recognise the personal and economic benefits to encryption, and that any backdoor into WhatsApp cannot remain exclusive to GCHQ, but would soon become known to foreign intelligence services or criminal groups.
Home Secretary and Europol are demanding companies such as WhatsApp to install backdoors so that security services may read suspected terrorists’ messages. (Times, 27.03.17) The UK government may have ‘noble’ aims, but any backdoor would soon be found by the Russian or Chinese intelligence services. This would make the UK vulnerable to economic espionage, and have a chilling impact on dissidents in those countries. It could also be exploited by groups such as Anonymous, which may use intercepted messages to harass vulnerable groups such as LGBT+ people. T
Unfortunately, the petition had a character limit, so here are a few more words about the issue.
The petition is in response to the Home Secretary Amber Rudd’s demand towards (and plans to force) messaging services such as WhatsApp, Telegram and Apple iMessage, which offer end-to-end encryption for their users, to open up backdoors for the UK security services, ostensibly as a response to the reports that the Westminster attacker Khalid Masood used WhatsApp to communicate, possibly in order to plan the attack (although this is not known). The government argues that this is just the modern equivalent of the traditional practice of steaming open the envelopes carrying letters of suspected criminals, but the analogy is a poor one. Never did the police have the power to systematically steam open all envelopes, without supervision. They were subject to limited jurisdiction; the American or Russian police had no right to enter a British post office and open the letters there.
The adage that ‘if you have nothing to hide then you have nothing to fear’ would be a valid argument iff (a) the British security services were the only people with the means to read your communications, and (b) their only motives were to prevent crime and terrorism, for some suitable definition of ‘crime’ and ‘terrorism’. The first assumption is a terrible one. There have been countless examples of individuals or small groups finding weaknesses in widely-used software, such as the Heartbleed bug and Shellshock. What is there to stop a third party from finding and opening a backdoor intended only for GCHQ? It is a longstanding principle of cryptography that ‘security by obscurity‘ offers very little security. Once the weakness becomes available to others, the second assumption also goes out of the window. Unfortunately, the Russian and Chinese police and intelligence agencies have rather different ideas about what counts as ‘terrorism’. By forcing messaging companies to open up loopholes in their encryption, the UK government would be indirectly supporting the surveillance mechanisms of those states.
In fact, even the UK’s police and intelligence services should not be idolised (although it was tempting to do this after a police officer died in the Westminster attack). A day before the attack, it was reported that the Met Police spied on Greenpeace activists, in coordination with Indian police and mercenary crackers. Greenpeace may have more destructive elements, but these activists were mostly peaceful protestors and the surveillance could not be justified as being in order to pre-empt a criminal act.
Moreover, groups such as Anonymous have habitually practised the ‘doxing‘ of individuals, as in the Gamergate controversy, releasing personally sensitive information about other people. For example, some gay and transgender people have been threatened with being outed, as a means of blackmailing or otherwise harassing them. Being gay or transgender isn’t illegal in most of the West, but it can still have a social stigma that is strong enough to make this an effective tactic. This sort of abuse would only become much more common if its practitioners were able to intercept the messages of vulnerable people. Hence, privacy should be regarded as an LGBT+ issue as well.
A purely military solution cannot win a war. This truth has been expounded by military thinkers such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and we continue to learn it the hard way. In the warfare of the computer era, a purely technical solution can be no better. A backdoor may help the police find the motives and co-conspirators of Khalid Masood in this instance, but it cannot be seen as a panacea for terrorism. People will still become terrorists or dissidents if they are drawn by political or social causes, and it is at these that we must strike.
I am currently waiting at Portland airport for the first of my flights back to Britain, after the APS DFD conference (which may be the subject of a future post).
One strange aspect of this airport is the way that seats will be assigned. At all other instances of flying, I have always been able to select a seat while checking in, before waiting at the gate. Here (and perhaps it’s specific to the airline Delta), people have not had their seats assigned to them yet; the gate staff is calling people up to the desk, one by one, to give us our seats.
This system is slow and inefficient. Moreover, calling people up by publicly announcing the names on our passports has questionable privacy implications: In particular, for transgender people who do not necessarily go by the names on their passports. (This provides another counterexample to the ‘nothing to hide’ argument.)